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ABSTRACT. This paper derives the optimal money injection at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), in a
tractable model where households hold heterogeneous money holdings due to explicit financial fric-
tions, such as limited participation or temporary binding credit constraints. This framework is moti-
vated by recent empirical findings. A deleveraging shock generates deflationary pressure and a fall
in the real interest rate, pushing the economy to the ZLB. The main result is that open-market opera-
tions can stabilize the economy at the ZLB whereas lump-sum money transfers cannot. Moreover, an
optimal money injection does not avoid the economy being at the ZLB.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The role of monetary policy in a liquidity trap, i.e when the nominal interest rate reaches the
zero lower bound (ZLB), is now acknowledged to be a major issue. After Japan, the Euro area
and the US central banks have decided to inject massive quantities of money, a policy labeled
quantitative easing, at zero interest rates. The channels through which such money creation could
have real effects are still not well understood, and the empirical assessment of the real effects of
such policies is still under debate. In addition to these positive effects, the optimal design of money
injection in a liquidity trap is an open question1.
The contribution of this paper is to identify optimal monetary policy at the ZLB in a model
where households have heterogeneous money holdings, based on explicit financial frictions. In
This paper has benefited from discussions with Plamen Nenov, Pierre-Olivier Weil, Francesco Lippi, Albert Marcet,
John Leahy and Franc¸ois Velde, Jordi Gali, Jaume Ventura and seminar participants in CSIC, BI in Oslo, NYU AD,
CREI and Banque de France. Xavier Ragot, CNRS (UMR 8545), Paris School of Economics (CNRS) and OFCE. Email:
xavier.ragot@gmail.com.
1Developments in 2015 in the Euro area have shown that the nominal interest rate can be negative because of ad-
ditional opportunity costs to hold money, such as the costs of storing cash for instance. I do not try to estimate these
additional costs, and the zero lower bound is defined as a floor 0 for the nominal interest rate, as done by the papers
in this literature (Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Werning (2011)
among others)
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this setup, it is shown that money injections have a real effect even at the ZLB, and that open-
market operations (contrary to lump-sum money transfer) can stabilize the economy after financial
shocks. Household heterogeneity thus helps to clarify the role of the money injections, and more
precisely the role of the central bank balance sheet at the zero lower bound.
The motivation for this model is based on recent developments in households’ money demand.
First, the distribution of money (M1) in the US is very unequal across households (Erosa and
Ventura (2002)), and money inequality is comparable to wealth inequality, and much higher than
consumption inequality Ragot (2014)). In addition, financial frictions, such as limited participa-
tion in financial markets or credit constraints, are key to understand households’ money holdings
(Alvarez and Lippi (2009)). As a consequence, the redistributive effects of monetary policy can
be expected to have a first-order effect on the economy. In this paper, limited participation in fi-
nancial markets is thus introduced to generate at the same time a well-defined money demand
and money holding heterogeneity. This paper thus departs from the assumption of a representa-
tive agent to study monetary policy at the ZLB. The representative agent assumptions generate
the result that money injections done by open-market operations are irrelevant for both nominal
and real variables, even at the zero lower bound ( Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)). Compared
to this benchmark, this paper shows that open-market operations have a real effect when agents
hold heterogeneous money holdings and that, in addition, these operations have a comparative
advantage over other forms of money creation, such as lump-sum money transfers.
Before presenting the model it may be useful to provide some simple intuitions of the new
channels generated by financial frictions and agents’ heterogeneity at the ZLB. At the ZLB, open-
market operations swap two assets with the same zero-nominal return and the same risk (money
and public debt). This has a real effect because open-market operations affect the distribution of
money and the tax system through an effect on the State budget. The redistributions generated
by open-market operations have real effects at the ZLB if some agents face credit constraints at
the ZLB. This mechanism is likely to be important, as many analyses of the 2008 crisis in the US
identify a tightening of the credit constraint as a key cause of the low observed real interest rate (
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011); Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) among others).
The goal of this paper is to explicitly derive optimal monetary policy in a liquidity trap, in a mi-
crofounded monetary heterogeneous agents model. These monetary heterogeneous agent models
are known to be very hard to solve, and generally require numerical techniques to be simulated,
which prevents the clear identification of optimal policies (see the literature review below). For this
reason, the strategy of this paper is to provide a simple model to derive optimal monetary policy
with paper and pencil, to clearly identify the trade-offs. To justify that this simple model is relevant
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and can be of independent interest, a careful motivation of the required simplifying assumptions
is provided in Section 2. More precisely, a flexible-price endowment economy is considered, where
some agents always participate in financial markets whereas other agents don’t participate in fi-
nancial markets and can only hold money to smooth income fluctuations. All agents face credit
constraints, but these ones only bind in equilibrium for non-participating households2. When the
ZLB does not bind, only non-participating agents hold money, because money is a dominated
asset. Only when the ZLB binds do participating households hold money.
In this economy, an unanticipated once-for-all tightening of the credit constraints is modeled.
The ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy, i.e. to undo the effect of such a shock, is
analyzed. The model yields three results.
First, and as can be expected, the tightening of the credit constraint pushes the economy to
the zero lower bound for two reasons. It first decreases the real interest rate because, as gross
borrowing is reduced, the market-clearing interest rate must decrease, as discussed by Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). Second, a tightening of the credit
constraint induces deflationary pressures, because it increases real money demand. In this case,
non-participating agents must indeed hold more money to smooth consumption.
Second, when the zero lower bound does not bind, monetary policy can stabilize the economy
whatever the process of money creation: open-market operations or helicopter drops of money.
Indeed, optimal monetary policy improves the consumption smoothing of all agents by affecting
the relative wealth of different types of agents. The redistributive effects of monetary policy are key
to understand the results, and they should be contrasted with a more direct fiscal policy to transfer
wealth across agents. As discussed in the paper, the comparative advantage of monetary policy
compared to fiscal policy is that it allows reaching the first-best allocation without any information
about the identity of agents (or about their decision to participate in financial markets).
The third and main result of this analysis is that monetary policy can also stabilize the economy
if the ZLB is binding, but only if money is created by open-market operations. Helicopter drops
of money have real effects but don’t allow fully stabilizing the economy. Monetary policy can
stabilize the economy, because agents participating in financial markets start holding money at the
ZLB, which alters the distribution of money across agents. The optimal use of this new money
demand by monetary authorities increases the ability to stabilize the economy. Full stabilization
can be obtained by open-market operations only, because of the difference in the redistributive
2The model can be seen as a mix of Alvarez and Lippi (2014) and Woodford (1990): Limited participation is modeled
as an exogenous share of households not participating in financial markets, and it embeds the role of money as a
consumption smoothing device because of incomplete markets.
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effect of open-market operations and helicopter drops of money. Open-market operations de facto
generate a money creation targeted to a sub-group of agents, who participate in financial markets
(and sell or buy some financial assets against money), and it has a more complex effect on the State
budget, because it affects current and future transfers through the redistribution of the profits of
the central bank. At the ZLB the size of the central bank balance sheet is thus key to improving
the market allocation. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to identify such a sharp difference
between helicopter drops of money and open-market operations at the ZLB. For this reason, the
difference between the two processes of money creation is carefully investigated.
This last result has important implications for monetary policy. First, the quantity of money
matters, but more importantly the process of money creation is crucial at the ZLB. Second, the ZLB
is not a constraint for monetary policy, when the process of money creation is optimally defined
(i.e. open-market operations). These sharp results obviously depend on the model simplifying
assumptions, and their relevance for more general environments is discussed in the concluding
remarks. These results favor the view that periods when the ZLB binds are special times, which
need special tools, but that these can be handled by monetary policy if the central bank manages
the size of its balance sheet.
In monetary debates, the claim that the size of the central bank balance sheet has real effects
is often attributed to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), after their analysis of monetary policy in
the Great Depression (see Buera and Nicolini (2014) for a recent paper). The fact that introduc-
ing agents’ heterogeneity confirms the Friedman and Schwartz view about the role of the central
bank balance sheet should not come as a surprise. Indeed, the heterogeneous agents model, af-
ter the seminal contribution of Bewley (1983), is explicitly inspired by the informal money theory
presented in the analysis by Friedman (1969) of the optimum quantity of money, which explicitly
introduces households’ heterogeneous money holdings, and considers the redistributive effect of
monetary policy.
In the recent literature, the current paper is first related to the literature on heterogeneous agents
and limited participation in monetary models. Second, it is related to papers studying the mone-
tary policy at the zero lower bound.
Heterogeneous households in monetary economics. On the modeling side, the current paper is close
to the literature analyzing the implications of limited participation for monetary policy in simple
environments (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002); Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2009); Al-
varez and Lippi (2014) among others). In this literature, the contribution of my model is to simplify
the environment to be able to derive optimal monetary policy simply both at the ZLB and outside
the ZLB.
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There is a growing literature on agents’ heterogeneity in monetary models to study the redis-
tributive effects of monetary policy in realistic environments (Bewley (1983) for a seminal contri-
bution; Kehoe, levine, and Woodford (1992); Erosa and Ventura (2002); Algan and Ragot (2010);
Ragot (2015) among others). In this quantitative literature, there are some technical issues about
simulating these models when the economy can temporarily hit the zero lower bound. Recently,
Ragot (2014), following some early insight in Erosa and Ventura (2002), has shown that the intro-
duction of limited participation in this type of model is key to reproduce a realistic distribution of
money. The modeling strategy of the current paper is to simplify the environment to be able to
derive optimal monetary policy at the ZLB.
Monetary policy in a liquidity trap has been studied in representative-agent, cashless economies
with sticky prices (Werning (2011); Cochrane (2015)). The current model with heterogeneous
money holdings and flexible prices identifies other mechanisms based on the redistributive ef-
fects of monetary policy, such as the role of the money-creation process. The interaction of the
two frictions (sticky-prices and financial frictions generated the money demand) is discussed in
the concluding remarks.
Recent papers have studied the positive effect of money injection in a liquidity trap in models
where financial frictions mainly affect firms or entrepreneurs and limit the efficiency of capital
allocation (Buera and Nicolini (2014); Bachetta, Benhima, and Kalantzis (2015)). These papers do
not consider optimal policies.
Section 2 justifies the simplifying assumptions. Section 3 presents the model. Section analyses
the model when the ZLB does not bind. Section 4 derives optimal monetary policy at the ZLB.
Section 6 is the conclusion.
2. FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND MONEY
This paper relies on some sharp simplifications to be able to identify optimal monetary policy. It
is assumed that 1) some agents will always participate in financial markets, whereas others never
participate in financial markets. 2) Agents not participating in financial markets face fluctuating
income and use money to smooth consumption 3) Non-participating agents experience an unex-
pected tightening of the credit constraint. This section justifies these three key assumptions.
The assumption of limited participation is motivated by the analysis of households’ portfolios.
Summarizing the Survey of Consumer Finance results, Bricker, Dettling, Henriques, Hsu, Moore,
Sabelhaus, Thompson, and Windle (2014) show that roughly half of the population (usually the
most wealthy) participates in the stock market either directly or indirectly. The fraction of the
population using financial assets to smooth consumption in the business cycle may be smaller
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than half of the population, because an important part of those financial assets are saved in retire-
ment plans. Recently Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) concluded that one should consider
”wealthy hand-to-mouth” households to account for the response of household consumption to
changes in fiscal policy: Although some agents have financial wealth, they do not use it to smooth
the effect of a transitory income shock. For this reason, and following the order of magnitude of
Challe and Ragot (2016), it will be assumed that 2/3 of the population does not use financial assets
(i.e. non-monetary assets) to smooth consumption, whereas 1/3 can use financial assets.
The second assumption is that non-participating agents (denoted as N-agents in the model) use
money to smooth fluctuating incomes. This is the Bewley theory of money. To obtain tractability,
we elaborate on the Woodford (1990) model in a monetary setting. It is assumed that half of
the non-participating households (thus 1/3 of the total population) receives some income in odd
periods and wants to consume in even periods, whereas the other half receives some income in
even period and consumes in odd periods. This generates a demand for money in all periods for
consumption smoothing. Deterministic income fluctuations can be seen as an extreme case of the
Bewley model to obtain tractability. These two assumptions together imply that the money is held
by the wealth-poor agents when the ZLB does not bind, which is a consistent result. As shown
by Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Ragot (2014), the wealth-rich have indeed a much lower share of
their wealth in money than do the wealth-rich. In this setup, the participating agents hold money
only at the ZLB, i.e. only when the return on money and financial assets is the same.
The third assumption is that non-participating agents face borrowing constraints and experience
an unexpected tightening of the credit constraint. Following many contributions in the literature
(Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011); Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)), this assumption captures the
US households’ deleveraging process after 2008.
3. THE MODEL
Time is discrete and periods are indexed by t = 0, 1... The model features a closed economy
populated by a continuum of households indexed by i and uniformly distributed along the unit
interval, as well as a representative firm. Households have a log period utility function u (c) =
log c, but the model can be extended to a CRRA utility function at the cost of more algebra. The
discount factor is β. It is assumed that the economy is composed of two types of households.
There is a fraction Ω = 23 of agents, denoted as N-households, who must pay a fixed cost κ
N
each time they want to participate in financial markets. The remaining fraction 1 − Ω = 13 of
households, denoted as P−households, don’t pay any cost to save in financial markets. The cost
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κN is determined in Section 3.2 below. It is high enough such that N-households never participate
in financial markets. As a consequence, only P−households participate in financial markets.3
We will assume
β > 2/3
In addition, we assume that all households face a borrowing limit dt ≤ 1 in all periods. This
borrowing limit is the maximum claims that households can issue in each period. Before period
0, the borrowing limit is d∗, and in period 0, there is an unexpected change in the borrowing limit
which follows a path dt, t ≥ 0. After period 0, no other shocks hit the economy. As a consequence,
the focus of the paper is on the adjustment of the economy after an unexpected change in the
borrowing limit.
3.1. Agents.
3.1.1. Non-participating households. N−households are denoted by the upper-script n. A fraction
Ω/2 = 1/3 consumes in odd periods and receives one unit of goods in even periods. The other
fraction Ω/2 consumes in even periods and receives one unit of goods in odd periods. The price
of the final good in period t is denoted Pt and pit = PtPt−1 − 1 is the net inflation rate. In all periods,
households may receive a real transfer τt from the state.
In period t, households cannot issue some money but they can sell claims on period t+ 1 goods,
up to the limit dt. Denote as Qt the nominal price of those claims in period t.
It is conjectured (and it is checked below) that 1) N−households save in money when they re-
ceive some income and 2) N-households hit the borrowing constraint when they consume. Denote
as Mnt the nominal quantity of money saved by N-households when they receive some income.
When N−households consume, they consume the amount
Ptcnt = M
n
t−1 + Ptτt + Qtdt
The right-hand side is the sum of past saving in money Mnt−1, of the transfer from the State Ptτt
and the money obtained by selling the dt claims in period t. In real terms consumption is
cnt =
mnt−1
1+ pit
+ τt + qtdt (1)
where mNt−1 = M
N
t−1/Pt−1 and qt = Qt/Pt is the price of a claim in real terms.
3This participations costs structure is a simplification of the general framework of Alvarez et al. (2002). It allows
studying limited participation in a simple environment such as the one of Alvarez and Lippi (2014). It would be very
easy to introduce the same participation cost for P-households at the cost of more algebra.
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The fractionΩ/2 who gets one unit of endowment but does not consume save in money the real
amount
mnt = 1+ τt − dt−1 (2)
The quantity 1 + τt is the real value of the endowment after the transfer. The quantity −dt−1 is
the repayment of the dt−1 claims issued in the previous period.
For this allocation to be an equilibrium, N−households must hit the credit constraint when they
consume. The condition is
qtu′ (cnt ) > β2
1
1+ pit+2
u′ (cnt+2) (3)
The left-hand side is the marginal gain of issuing one additional claim in period t. The right-hand
side is the marginal cost: If households issue one additional claim in period t, they will have less
goods in period t + 1. As the have saved in money (because they do not consume in period t + 1),
these goods generate an income 11+pit+2 in period t+ 2, which is valued β
2u′
(
cnt+2
) 1
1+pit+2
in period
t. When the condition is fulfilled, households would like to issue claims at period t and hit the
credit constraint dt.
An additional condition is that N−households don’t hold money when they consume (i.e. they
consume all their income). Along the same lines, this condition is
u′ (cnt ) > β2
1
1+ pit+1
1
1+ pit+2
u′ (cnt+2) (4)
These two conditions will be fulfilled in the economies studied below, even when the ZLB is bind-
ing.
3.1.2. Participating Households. Variables concerning P−households are indicated by the upper-
script p. These households supply one unit of labor every period. They can save in money and in
financial markets4. P− households can buy three types of assets: money or claims issued either by
the State (i.e. government debt) or by N−households. In period t, they buy a quantity bgt of claims
on the government, which pay a nominal interest rate it between period t and period t + 1. As a
consequence, the period t real return of the quantity bgt−1 of goverment debt bought in period t− 1
is 1+it−11+pit b
g
t−1.
P−households buy a quantity bht of claims issued by N−households at a real price qt and they
may hold a real quantity mpt ≥ 0 of money. The after-transfer income of P−households is 1+ τt in
period t. For symmetry reasons, we also assume that P−households can’t issue more claims than
the borrowing limit dt, but this constraint will not bind in the equilibrium under consideration.
4It is direct to introduce consumption and income every two-periods for P−households for them to have the same
utility function as non-participating agents. This would only generate more algebra.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A LIQUIDITY TRAP WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS 9
The budget constraint of a representative P−households and the conditions on money holdings
are:
qtbht + b
g
t + m
p
t + c
p
t = 1+ τt + b
h
t−1 +
mpt−1
1+ pit
+
1+ it−1
1+ pit
bgt−1 (5)
mpt ≥ 0 (6)
bht ≥ −dt (7)
where cpt is real consumption. The right-hand side is the after-tax income 1+ τt plus the return
on the three assets. The left-hand side is private consumption plus the cost of investment in the
three assets. Standard intertemporal utility maximization yields the three first-order conditions,
for t ≥ 0:
qtu′
(
cpt
) ≥ βu′ (cpt+1) (8)
u′
(
cpt
) ≥ β 1+ it
1+ pit+1
u′
(
cpt+1
)
(9)
u′
(
cpt
) ≥ β 1
1+ pit+1
u′
(
cpt+1
)
(10)
The first condition is an equality when P-households do not face the credit constraint, which will
always be the case. The second condition is an equality when P-households hold government debt,
which will also again be the case in the equilibrium under consideration. Considering the first two
conditions with equalities, one finds the no-arbitrage condition
1
qt
=
1+ it
1+ pit+1
(11)
The real return on government bonds is the real return on claims, because there is no aggregate
shock after period 0, and there are thus no risk premia. The third inequality (10) is an equality
if P−households hold money. Observing the second and third inequality, this cannot be the case
when it > 0. In other words, only when it = 0, i.e. at the ZLB, can P−households hold money. At
the ZLB, considering the first and the third conditions with equalities, one finds the condition on
the inflation
1+ pit+1 ≥ qt and mpt = 0 if 1+ pit+1 > qt
Monetary policy and the State budget. The monetary authorities issue a real quantity mCBt of money
at each period t. To consider a general case, it is assumed that the monetary authorities issue
a fraction θmCBt of money by lump-sum transfers to all households and a fraction (1− θ)mCBt
by open-market operations. The money issued by open-market operations is used to buy a real
quantity of public debt xt ≡ (1− θ)mCBt in period t, which will generate a real profit for the
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central bank xt 1+it1+pit+1 ≡ (1− θ)mCBt 1+it1+pit+1 in period t + 1. As is standard, it is assumed that this
profit is given back to the State at period t + 1.
Denote as Mtott the nominal quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t. As the
(nominal) new money created in period t is PtmCBt , the nominal quantity of money in period t is
Mtott = M
tot
t−1 + Ptm
CB
t . Denote m
tot
t = M
tot
t /Pt, the real quantity of money in circulation. We have
the law of motion
mtott =
mtott−1
1+ pit
+ mCBt (12)
It is assumed that the State issues a quantity of debt d¯g at each period t, to finance a public good
g¯. The budget of the State is
g¯ + d¯g
1+ it−1
1+ pit
+ λt = d¯g + (1− θ)mCBt−1
1+ it−1
1+ pit
where λt is the (net ) fiscal transfer to each household, which is different from the total transfer
τt, which also includes the new money created by lump-sum transfers. As a normalization, and
without loss of generality, I set g¯ = d¯g = 0. As a consequence, λt = (1− θ)mCBt−1 1+it−11+pit . In other
words, the profits generated by monetary operations are given back to households. The total
transfer τt received by each household is thus the sum of the lump-sum money transfer θmCBt and
λt = (1− θ)mCBt−1 1+it−11+pit . Using the equality (11), we obtain
τt = θmCBt +
(1− θ)mCBt−1
qt−1
(13)
3.2. Market equilibrium. There are four market equilibria in this economy. First, the equilibrium
of the money market implies that the real quantity of money mtott is held either by the fraction
Ω/2 = 1/3 of N−households who save in money or by the fraction 1−Ω = 1/3 of P−households,
if they hold some money. Hence mtot = 13 m
n
t +
1
3 m
p
t , or
3mtott = m
n
t + m
p
t (14)
As only P−households participate in financial markets, the equilibrium on the market for claims
is (1−Ω) bht = Ω2 dt, or
bht = dt
Public debt (in zero supply) is bought either by the (1− Ω) P−households or by the monetary
authorities for a quantity xt = (1− θ)mCBt :
1
3
bgt + (1− θ)mCBt = 0 (15)
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Finally, the goods market equilibrium stipulates that the total quantity of goods (1−Ω) + Ω2
in each period is consumed either by P−households or by N−households who consume. Hence,
(1−Ω) cpt + Ω2 cnt = (1−Ω) + Ω2 or, as Ω = 2/3 :
cpt + c
n
t = 2 (16)
3.3. Summary of the model. It may be useful to summarize the equations defining the equilib-
rium under consideration, using market equilibria to substitute for bht and b
g
t .
mnt = 1+ τt − dt−1 (17)
cnt =
mnt−1
1+ pit
+ τt + qtdt (18)
qt
(
dt − 3 (1− θ) m
CB
t
qt
)
+ mpt + c
p
t = 1+ τt
+
(
dt−1 − 3
(1− θ)mCBt−1
qt−1
)
+
mpt−1
1+ pit
(19)
qtu′
(
cpt
)
= βu′
(
cpt+1
)
(20)
mpt = 0 if 1+ pit+1 > qt (21)
mnt + m
p
t =
mnt−1 + m
p
t−1
1+ pit
+ 3mCBt (22)
τt = θmCBt + (1− θ)
mCBt−1
qt−1
(23)
Together with the inequalities
cnt , c
p
t , m
n
t , m
p
t ≥ 0 (24)
1+ pit+1 ≥ qt (25)
and the condition
qtu′ (cnt ) > β2
1
1+ pit+2
u′ (cnt+2) (26)
Equation (17) is the money demand of N−households in periods when they work and don’t
consume. Equation (??) is the consumption of these N−households when they consume but don’t
work. These two equations assume that N-households don’t hold money when they consume, and
thus that condition (4) is fulfilled. It is checked that it is the case, in all equilibria under consider-
ation. Equation (19) is the budget constraint of P−households. The financial market equilibrium
(15) has been used to substitute for bgt+1. Equation (20) is the Euler equation of P−households.
Equation (21) is the Euler equation of P−households for money holdings: P−households only
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hold money if the zero-lower bound is binding. Equality (22) is the money market equilibrium,
and equality (23) is the process of money creation.
Inequality (24) stipulates that consumption can’t be negative and that households cannot issue
money. Inequality (25) is the zero lower bound.
Finally, condition (26) is the condition for the equilibrium under consideration to exist (i.e. the
credit constraint binds for N−households). Note that inequality (25) implies that when this in-
equality is satisfied, inequality (4) is also satisfied, and N-households never save in money in
periods where they consume.
3.4. Steady State. The steady-state allocation is defined as an allocation where no money is cre-
ated (mCB = 0), where the credit limit is constant and equal to d∗, and where real variables are
constant. Steady-state values are denoted with a star and, for instance, cn∗ is the steady-state con-
sumption of N−households. One easily finds that τ∗ = 0 and that the financial market equilibrium
implies bh∗ = d∗ and that the money held by N−households who don’t consume is mn∗ = 1− d∗.
Moreover, the price of the financial asset is simply q∗ = β. Hence, the consumption of the two
types of agents is, from (??) and (19):
cn∗ = 1− (1− β) d∗
cp∗ = 1+ (1− β) d∗
Finally, note that in steady state, the inflation rate is 0, pi∗ = 0. As a consequence, conditions (3)
and (4) are fulfilled.
It will be assumed that the economy is in steady state and that at period 0 that it is hit only once
by an un-anticipated shock on the process dt, t ≥ 0. This implies that
d−1 = d∗, mn−1 = m
n∗, mp−1 = 0, m
CB
−1 = 0 (27)
Equilibrium definition: For a deterministic sequence of credit constraint {dt}t≥0 and monetary
policy {mCBt }t≥0, an equilibrium of this economy is a sequence {cnt , cpt , mnt , mpt , τt, qt,pit}t≥0 which
satisfies the seven equations (17)-(23), the inequality constraints (24)-(25), and the initial conditions
(27).
3.5. Optimal allocation. The first-best allocation is defined as follows. It is assumed that the plan-
ner gives a weight ωp to P−households and a weight 1 to N−households (without loss of general-
ity). The tilde is used to indicate the optimal allocation. For instance c˜nt is the optimal consumption
of a N−household in period t. The intertemporal social welfare function is
max
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
u (c˜nt ) +ωpu
(
c˜pt
))
(28)
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and the resource constraint of the planner is c˜nt + c˜
p
t = 2.
Using again asterisk to denote stationary values, the optimal allocation is thus simply defined
by the two equations u′ (c˜n∗) = ωpu′ (c˜p∗) and c˜n∗ + c˜p∗ = 2. In what follows, we use the specific
values of the Pareto weight ωp such that the steady-state allocation of the market economy is
optimal, which is summarized by by the following Assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1: The Pareto weight is chosen such that ωp =
u′(cn∗)
u′(cp∗) . The optimal allocation is thus
c˜nt = c
n∗ and c˜pt = cp∗.
In words, it is assumed that the goal of the planner is to stabilize the economy such that con-
sumption levels are equal to their steady-state value. As the only exogenous process is variations
in the borrowing limit dt, which does not affect aggregate resources (1−Ω) +Ω/2 = 2/3, this
allocation is always feasible. The rest of the paper is the analysis of the ability of monetary policy
to neutralize the effect on consumption of the credit constraint shock {dt}t≥0.
4. THE ECONOMY WHEN THE ZLB DOESN’T BIND
When the ZLB does not bind, to understand the structure of the model, one may first consider
the economy when monetary policy is inactive mCB = 0 and thus τt = 0. In this case, equations
(17)-(23) can be simply written as, for t ≥ 0
cpt = 1− qtdt + dt−1 +Θt
qtu′
(
cpt
)
= βu′
(
cpt+1
)
with
Θt ≡ (3− 2θ)mCBt − 2 (1− θ)
mCBt−1
qt−1
The first equation is the budget constraint of P−households, and the second equation is the
Euler equation. The third equation is the definition of Θt which summarizes the effect of money
creation. These three equations form a system that can be solved to find cpt , qt and Θt. The con-
sumption level of N−households is simply cnt = 2− cpt from the goods market equilibrium.
In general, equilibrium money creation is only a transfer between N and P−households. When
money is created as a lump-sum transfer, θ = 1, Θt = mCBt the transfer goes directly from N-
households (who hold money at the end of period) to P−households who sell all the money they
receive and do not hold money at the end of the period.
When money is created by open-market operations θ = 0, we have Θt ≡ 3mCBt − 2 m
CB
t−1
qt−1 . In this
case, the redistributive effect to P−households of the money created in the period (i.e. mCBt ) is
bigger because the monetary authorities transfer all the new money to participating households
buying some of their assets. Moreover, all agents benefit from the redistribution of the profits of
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the monetary authorities coming from the purchase of assets in the previous period. This appears
as a reduction in the transfer to P-households because a part of the return on the debt issued by
N−households is given back to these same households, by the monetary authorities, instead of
being fully received by P-households. These redistributive effects of lump-sum money creation
and open-market operations are different. This difference will be important only at the ZLB.
As can be seen from the previous system, money creation redistributes income across house-
holds, and can be used to undo the effect of a change in credit conditions. Indeed, the next Propo-
sition states that monetary policy can implement the first best, whatever the process of money
creation, i.e. whatever the value of θ.
Proposition 1. For θ ∈ [0, 1] the first best can be implemented when the ZLB doesn’t bind. Money creation
must follow the rule, for t ≥ 0
mCBt =
(d∗ − dt−1)− β (d∗ − dt)
3− 2θ + 2
1− θ
3− 2θ
mCBt−1
β
(29)
Proof. I first provide the necessary conditions. Assume that the ZLB does not bind (1 + pit+1 > qt
and mpt = 0, t ≥ 0) and that the first best is achieved, cnt = cn∗ and cpt = cp∗ = 1+ (1− β) d¯∗. As a
consequence, qt = β, from equation (20). Then using (19) and (23) to substitute for the value of τt,
one finds the quantity of money created in all periods that satisfies equality (29).
Second, assuming the money creation follows (29) and using (23), it is easy to check that the
first-best allocation is an equilibrium. In this case, the inflation rate is (with d−2 = d−1 = d∗)
1+ pit =
1+ mCBt−1 − dt−2
1− dt−1 − 2mCBt
Finally, note that the assumption 23 < β, ensures that
2(1−θ)
3−2θ
1
β < 1 and that money creation is not a
diverging process for all values of θ ∈ [0, 1], what ends the proof. 
When money is created by lump-sum transfers (θ = 1), the optimal process for money creation
is simply mCBt = (d
∗ − dt−1)− β (d∗ − dt). Money creation reacts to current and past values of the
credit constraint to undo the effect of a change in the ability to borrow. When money is created by
open-market operations (θ = 0), then optimal money creation is mCBt = ((d
∗ − dt−1)− β (d∗ − dt)) /3+
2
3βm
CB
t−1. Money creation now depends on the past money creation m
CB
t−1. In this case, the central
bank redistributes its profits generated by past money creation. Optimal monetary policy must
first undo this transfer and then implement the optimal redistribution across agents.
Finally, the assumption that the ZLB does not bind is an implicit assumption about the credit
constraint process dt. This assumption is valid if dt remains close to d∗ and a threshold is given in
the next Section for a specific process.
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Monetary and fiscal policy. Optimal monetary policy redistributes wealth across agents who have
different money holdings. One could argue that this should be the role of fiscal policy. Obviously,
if fiscal policy could generate lump-sum transfers between P−households and N−households
who are not working, the first-best allocation could be implemented. The relative advantage of
monetary policy is that it does not rely on the identity of households. Money transfers are the
same for all agents, and depends only on aggregate variable such as financial conditions (which
is here the severity of the financial constraint dt). Thus monetary policy is efficient even when
households are anonymous.
5. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AT THE ZLB
To further investigate the properties of the model, I now focus on a simple deleveraging shock:
Assume that d0 < d∗ and dt = d∗ for t ≥ 1. The credit contraint is more stringent than its steady-
state value only in period 0. This simplification, which is frequent in the literature (Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) among others), allows analytical characterization of the ZLB and optimal
monetary policy. The next Proposition first presents the effect of this deleveraging shock, when
monetary policy is inactive, i.e. mCBt = 0. The proofs of the following Propositions are in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2. If mCBt = 0:
1) The first-best allocation is an equilibrium after period 2 : cpt = c
p∗ and cnt = cn∗, for t ≥ 2
2) Period 0 interest rate and inflation rate are
1+ r0 =
1
q0
=
1
β
+
(
1
1+ d¯∗
+
1
β
)
d0 − d¯∗
1+ d¯∗
and pi1 =
d¯0 − d¯∗
1− d¯0
as consequence, a deleveraging shock (a decrease in d0) decreases both the real interest rate and the inflation
rate.
3) There is a threshold dthres0
dthres0 ≡
1+ 1−d¯∗β
((
β
1+d¯∗ + 1
)
d¯∗
1+d¯∗ − 1
)
1+ 1−d¯∗β
(
β
1+d¯∗ + 1
)
1
1+d¯∗
such that the ZLB binds in period 0 if d0 < dthres0 . In this case m
P
0 > 0.
The first part of the Proposition states the the interesting dynamic occurs between period 0 and
period 1. When mCBt = 0, it is easy to see that c
p
t = c
p∗ and cnt = cn∗, when t ≥ 2 (the economy is
back at its steady-state equilibrium in period 2).
The second part of the Proposition states that the more severe the credit constraint in period
0 (in other words, the smaller d0) the lower the real interest rate and the inflation rate between
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periods 0 and period 1. Indeed, when d0 decreases, there are less assets for P−households to save.
As a consequence, the price of the assets increases and the real interest rate decreases. This result
is also found in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). The new part concerns the inflation rate. When
d0 decreases, N−households borrow less in period 0. This implies that their income is higher in
period 1. Their period 1 saving in money increases, which contributes to decrease the period 1 price
level and thus the inflation rate between period 0 and period 1. As a consequence a deleveraging
shock is likely to push the economy to the ZLB, as both the real interest rate and the inflation rate
decreases.
The third part of the Proposition presents the threshold below which the economy hits the ZLB
in period 0. When the ZLB binds in period 0, we have q0 = 1 + pi1 (in other words, the nominal
interest rate is 0). Moreover, only in period 0 do P-households hold money: mP0 > 0, whereas
mPt = 0, for t = 1... The values of all variables as a function of d0 are provided in the proof of the
Proposition in the Appendix.
When the ZLB does not bind, in period 0, the previous Section has proven that optimal mon-
etary policy can implement the first best allocation. The interesting question is now the ability of
monetary policy to implement the first-best allocation, with a binding ZLB.
5.1. Lump-sum money transfers. The next Proposition first investigates the case of lump-sum
money creation.
Proposition 3. Assume d0 < dThreshold0 . If θ = 1 (lump-sum money creation):
1) Period 0 lump-sum money creation mCB0 > 0 changes consumption levels
2) The first-best allocation cannot be implemented.
The formal proof is in the Appendix, but the intuition can be provided. When money is cre-
ated by lump-sum transfers, the Proposition first shows that money creation is not neutral even
at the ZLB. The reason is that N-households who don’t work consume any additional transfer,
because the credit constraint is binding even at the ZLB. The interesting result is the second part
of the Proposition: Although money is not neutral, the first-best allocation cannot be implemented
if money is created by lump-sum transfers. To understand why, first note from Proposition 1 that
the optimal lump-sum money transfer (θ = 1) is 0, after period 2: mCBt = 0, for t ≥ 2. As a
consequence, the instruments to improve the allocation are only mCB0 and m
CB
1 . These two instru-
ments must be set to obtain 3 objectives. First, a period 0 transfer between N and P-households to
compensate for the decrease in the period 0 ability to borrow. Second, a period 1 transfer between
the same households to change the allocation (as N-households enter period 1 wilth less debt).
In addition, if the ZLB binds, to obtain cp0 = c
p
1 = c
p∗ we must have q0 = 1 + pi1 = β, from the
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Euler equation of P−households (20). The two instruments are not enough to match these three
objectives. As a final step of the proof, one can show that when d0 < dthres0 the quantity of money
to get out of the ZLB can’t implement the first best. The conclusion is thus that the first best can’t
be implemented by lump-sum money transfers. The next Section shows that this result crucially
depends on the process of money creation.
5.2. Open market operations.
Proposition 4. Assume d0 < dThreshold0 . If θ = 0 (open–market operations), the first-best allocation can be
implemented.
The process of money creation is
mCB0 =
(
1
β
− 1
)
(d∗ − 1) , mCB1 = −
mCB0
3β
and mCBt =
2mCBt−1
3β
, t ≥ 2 (30)
Open-market operations can implement the first-best allocation. What is the difference between
open-market operations and lump-sum money transfers? When the monetary authorities create
money in period t by open-market operations, they generate some distributional effect in period t,
because they create some money to buy bonds, but they also create some redistribution in period
t + 1 because they redistribute the profits generated by the holdings of bonds. As a consequence,
if the monetary authorities create some money in period 0 and period 1 to implement the first best,
they have to perform some operations to undo redistributive effects in period 2, which will create
some redistributive effects in period 3, which have to be undone, and so on. As a consequence, the
central bank instrument is now the whole sequence of money creation, mCBt 6= 0, for t ≥ 0, as can
be seen from equation (30). With this whole sequence, optimal money creation can now implement
cpt = c
p∗ and cnt = cn∗, when t ≥ 2 and q0 = 1+ pi1 = β.
In other words, open-market operations generate a more complex redistributive effect than
lump-sum money creation, which can be used to implement the first-best allocation. To my knowl-
edge, this paper is the first to show such a sharp difference between the two processes of money
creation. More generally, one should thus be careful about the process of money creation in the
growing literature about the redistributive effect of monetary policy, for both positive and norma-
tive analysis when the ZLB is considered.
5.3. Tightening of the credit constraint for many periods. To further investigate the properties of
the model, this section provides a numerical example to exhibit optimal monetary policy when the
economy experiences a long-lasting period of tightening of the credit constraint. It is now assumed
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that the credit constraint unexpectedly decreases in period 0 to dt = 0 for t = 0..T and then goes
back to dt = d∗ for t ≥ T + 1. The whole sequence of credit constraints is known by all agents at
period 0.
In the simple numerical example, it is assumed that β = 0.99, and that the credit limit is initially
at d∗ = 1% and decreases 0% for 20 periods. At period 21 the credit constraint moves back to
dt = d∗. Before providing the optimal monetary policy, Figure 1, Part A first plots the outcome of
the market economy when there is no money creation mCBt = 0.
The first panel plots the path of the borrowing limit dt. It goes back to its steady state value at
period 21. The second panel of the first line plots the consumption of P−households, in percentage
deviation from steady state. The first-best allocation is thus a 0 for this variable (cpt − cp∗ = 0%).
The tightening of the borrowing limit generates an increase in the consumption of P-households,
as N−households cannot borrow to consume (the consumption of N−households is simply cnt =
2 − cpt ). After the initial increase, the effect of the tightening of the borrowing limit is modest,
because N households increase their money demand to undo the expected credit limit. When the
credit limit goes back to its steady-state value, the effect is an increase in the consumption of the N-
households, who can borrow more, and thus a decrease in the consumption of P-households. The
third panel of Part A plots the inflation rate. The tightening of the borrowing limit generates an
increase of the money demand to undo the credit constraint. As a consequence, the price level falls
for the real quantity of money to increase. When the borrowing limit goes back to its steady-state
value, the demand for money decreases and the price level goes back to its steady-state.
The fourth panel plots the price qt of the claim on one unit of goods. This price qt = βc
p
t /c
p
t+1
follows the expected inverse of the ratio of the consumption of P-households (due to the Euler
equation of P−households). One can observe that the ZLB is binding in period 0. Indeed, 1 +
pi1 = q0 = 0.9933 and mP0 = 0.0033 > 0. The price of claims follows the consumption growth of
P−households.
Part B of Figure 1 plots the outcome for optimal money creation, when money is created by
open-market operations. The description of the procedure to find the optimal money creation is
described in Appendix D. In this case, the first-best allocation can be implemented and cpt = c
p∗,
cnt = c
n∗ and qt = β or t ≥ 0. As a consequence, only the path of money creation and of the inflation
rate are represented. One first observes that the ZLB is binding in period 0. Optimal monetary
policy does not avoid the ZLB. An initial decrease in the money supply ensures that q0 = 1+pi1 =
β and that initial wealth is transferred to N−households to undo the intial tightening of the credit
constraint. As money is created by open-market operations, the contraction of the money supply is
progressively undone, as was discussed after Proposition 4. When the credit constraint goes back
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FIGURE 1. Model outcome
Part A. No Money Creation
Part B. Optimal Money Creation
1
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to its intial value d∗, money is created to generate a transfer toward P−households (as can be seen
from the path of P−households, when no money is created). Again, a decrease in the quantity of
new money is necessary to undo the initial money creation.
Although the change in the level of the credit contraint pushes the economy to the ZLB, optimal
monetary policy doesn’t avoid the ZLB nor deflation.
5.4. Production economy. Although the results have been derived in an endowment economy (to
study the simplest model), all the results directly apply to a production economy. Indeed, as open-
market operations fully stabilize the economy (and the real interest rate), the marginal product of
capital, and hence the capital stock, can be stabilized at their first-best value. To consider this more
formally, the full model of the production economy is provided in Appendix E.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a simple model where agents hold heterogeneous money holdings due to
explicit financial frictions. Optimal monetary policy depends on the redistributive effects of mone-
tary policy and on the ability of agents to smooth consumption. At the ZLB, money injections have
real effects, but the surprising result is that the set of feasible allocations depends on the process of
money creation: Some desirable allocations can be achieved only by open-market operations and
not by lump-sum money transfers. Open-market operations indeed transfer money to the group
of agents participating in financial markets. In addition, they have an intertemporal effect on the
State budget because this affects future taxes. For instance, optimal policy induces a long-lasting
process of money injections, even after a short-lived tightening of the credit constraint.
This framework has been studied with flexible prices to provide analytical proof, in line with
many contributions considering financial frictions (Buera and Nicolini (2014); Bachetta et al. (2015)
or Azariadis, Bullard, Singh, and Suda (2015) among others). The consideration of sticky prices
is a natural extension and would need a more quantitative analysis. Obviously, the result about
the difference between open-market operations and lump-sum money creation would not be so
clear-cut. Nevertheless, the additional gain of open-market operations compared to lump-sum
money transfers (which is to transfer money only to participating households) would remain. This
additional gain could emerge as a lower quantity of created money to reach a similar allocation.
This is left for future research.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
A.1. Allocation when the ZLB does not bind and existence conditions. We first define the allo-
cation and the threshold for an equilibrium to exist when the ZLB does not bind. It is thus assumed
that mCBt = τt = m
P
t = 0 for t ≥ 0.
We solve for the allocation backward, from period 2 to period 1 and finally, to period 0.
For t ≥ 2 (as dt = d∗ for t≥ 1), equations (19) and (20) are
qtd∗ + c
p
t = 1+ d
∗
qtu′
(
cpt
)
= βu′
(
cpt+1
)
The only equilibrium sequence in this case is, for t ≥ 2
cpt = c
p∗
qt = β
The budget constraint (19) and the Euler equation (20) in period 1 are (using u (c) = log c)
cp1 = 1−
(
q1d¯∗ − d¯0
)
q1cp∗ = βc
p
1
Solving for q1, one finds
q1 = β
1+ d¯0
1+ d¯∗
The budget constraint (19) and the Euler equation (20) in period 0 are
cp0 = 1−
(
q0d¯0 − d¯∗
)
q1c
p
1 = βc
p
0
Solving for q0, using the expression of q1 in the value of c
p
1 :
q0 =
β
1+
(
β
1+d¯∗ + 1
)
d0−d¯∗
1+d¯∗
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Under these assumptions, equations (17) and (22) are mnt = 1− dt−1 and mnt = mnt−1/ (1+ pit) for
t ≥ 0, from which one easily deduces the inflation rate
pi0 = 0
pi1 =
d¯0 − d¯∗
1− d¯0
pi2 =
d¯∗ − d¯0
1− d¯∗
pit = 0, t ≥ 3
Note first that the ZLB cannot bind in period 1. Indeed, we can check
q1 = β
1+ d¯0
1+ d¯∗
≤ 1 ≤ 1+ pi2 = 1− d¯01− d¯∗
The question is to check if the ZLB binds in period 0.
Using the previous values, one can check that 1+ pi1 > q0 ⇔ d0 ≥ dthres0 where
dthres0 =
1+ 1−d¯∗β
((
β
1+d¯∗ + 1
)
d¯∗
1+d¯∗ − 1
)
1+ 1−d¯∗β
(
β
1+d¯∗ + 1
)
1
1+d¯∗
As a consequence, the ZLB binds necessarily in period 0 when d0 < dthres0 .
A.2. Allocation when d0 < dthres0 . We now compute the equilibrium allocation when the ZLB
binds in period 0 to show that the equilibrium exists and that in particular mP0 > 0. Binding ZLB
in period 0 implies q0 = 1+ pi1. We show that q0, q1 and m
p
0 solve a system of three equations.
As before the economy is in steady state after period 2. The budget constraint (19) and the Euler
equation (20) in period 1 are now
cp1 = 1+ d0 − q1d∗ +
mp0
1+ pi1
q1cp∗ = βc
p
1
Substituting cp1 with the two previous equations and using q0 = 1+ pi1, one finds a first equation
q1
(
d¯1 +
cp∗
β
)
= 1+ d¯0 +
mp0
q0
(31)
Using the period 0 and period 1 money market equilibrium (22), one finds
q0 = 1+ pi1 =
mn0 + m
p
0
mn1
=
mn∗
1+ pi0
1
1− d¯0
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Using this expression in the budget constraint of consuming N−households (??) in period 0, one
finds
cn0 = q0 and c
p
0 = 2− q0
Using the budget constraint of P−households in period 0 (19), one finds
q0
(
d¯0 − 1
)
+ mp0 + 2 = 1+ d¯
∗ (32)
Finally, the Euler equation of P−households in period 0 and in period 1 gives
cp0 =
q0q1
β2
= 2− q0 (33)
We can solve for q1 using the three equations (31)-(33)
q1 =
d¯∗−1
2 + 2
d¯1 + c
p∗
β
(
1− d¯∗−12β
) = d¯∗−12 + 2
d¯∗ + cp∗β
(
1− d¯∗−12β
)
Then we have
q0 =
2
q1
β2
cp∗ + 1
and
q0
[
q1
(
d¯∗ +
cp∗
β
)
− (1+ d¯0)] = mp0
One can check that mp0
(
dthres0
)
= 0 and mP0 (d0) is decreasing, which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
B.1. Proof of 1). It is assumed that θ = 1 (lump-sum money creation). We show that when the ZLB
binds in period 0 a small money injection has to change the consumption level. We investigate the
effect of a small money injection in period 0 mCB0 > 0 and m
CB
t = 0 for t ≥ 1.
First, the variables in the allocation with mCB0 = 0 are denoted with a hat. For instance, period
0 (respec. period 1) consumption is cˆn0 (respec. cˆ
n
1 ). The variables in the allocation with a positive
money creation mCB0 > 0 are noted without a hat. It is shown that we cannot have cˆ
n
t = c
n
t and
cˆpt = c
p
t for t ≥ 0.
The proof is made by contradiction. Assume that cˆnt = c
n
t and cˆ
p
t = c
p
t for t ≥ 0. As
qˆ0cˆ
p
1 = βcˆ
p
0
qˆ1cˆ
p
2 = βcˆ
p
1
1+ pˆi1 = qˆ0
24 XAVIER RAGOT
As a consequence, we must have
q0 = qˆ0 = 1+ pi1
q1 = qˆ1
pi1 = pˆi1
But as
cn1 =
mn0
1+ pi1
+ q1d¯1 =
mn0
1+ pˆi1
+ qˆ1d¯1 = cˆn1
we must have
mn0 = mˆ
n
0
As mn0 = 1− d¯∗ + mCB0 and mˆn0 = 1− d¯∗, this implies mCB0 = 0. This is a contradiction.
B.2. Proof of 2).
B.2.1. Step 1. It is assumed that θ = 1. The proof is made in two steps. First I show that when
d0 < dthreshold0 , if monetary policy can implement the first best, then the ZLB must bind in period 0.
The proof is made by contradiction.
Assume that monetary policy implements the first best, and that the ZLB doesn’t bind in period
0. Then the result of Proposition 1 implies that we must have
mCB0 = β
(
d¯0 − d¯∗
)
mCB1 =
(
d¯0 − d¯∗
)
With these expressions, the money demand of N−households in period 0 and period 1 (17) with
(τt = mCBt ) are
mn1 = 1− d¯0 and mn0 = 1− d¯∗ + β
(
d¯0 − d¯∗
)
Using the period 1 money market equilibrium (22), one finds the inflation rate
1+ pi1 =
1− d¯∗ + β (d¯0 − d¯∗)
1− d¯∗ − 3 (d¯0 − d¯∗)
The condition 1+ pi1 > β is equivalent to
d0 > d∗ − (1− β)
(
1− d¯∗)
4β
As β > 2/3, one can check that dthreshold0 < d
∗ − (1−β)(1−d¯
∗)
4β . As a consequence, the previous
inequality is a contradiction as we assumed d0 < dthreshold0 .
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B.2.2. Step 2. We now show that the first-best allocation cannot be implemented when θ = 1 and
the ZLB binds in period 0.
Again, the proof is made by contradiction. Assume that the first best is implemented. In this
case, the period 0 and period 1 Euler equations of P−households (20) imply
q0 = q1 = β
As the ZLB is binding in period 0, 1 + pi1 = q0 = β. Using the period 0 and period 1 budget
constraint (19), one finds
mp0 = β
(
d¯∗ − d¯0
)
+ mCB0
mp0 + βm
CB
1 = β
(
d¯∗ − d¯0
)
This implies
mCB0 + βm
CB
1 = 0 (34)
Using the period 1 money market (22) together with the money demand (17), one finds that q0 =
1+ pi1 implies
mp0 = β
(
1− d¯0 − 2mCB1
)
− (1− d¯∗)−mCB0
Using this expression in the period 1 budget constraint of the P-households (19), one finds
mCB0 + βm
CB
1 = (1− β)
(
d¯∗ − 1)
We cannot have at the same time the previsous equality and equality (34), which proves the con-
tradiction.
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
It is assumed that θ = 0. It is proven that the money creation provided in the text implements
the first best, that the ZLB binds at period 0, and that all equilibrium conditions are fulfilled.
First, using the money creation process given in the text in the budget constraint of P−households,
one can check that cpt = c
p∗and thus cnt = cn∗ because of the goods market equilibrium. As a con-
sequence, the Euler equation (20) implies q0 = q1 = β.
Using the money demand (17), and the budget constraint (19) in the period 1 money market
equilibrium (22), one finds that 1+ pi1 = β.
Using the period 2 money market, one finds that
pi2 =
d¯∗ − d¯0 + ∆CB0 + ∆CB1
1− d¯∗ − ∆CB1
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One can check the two conditions
1 > β2
1
1+ pi1
1
1+ pi2
and q0 > β2
1
1+ pi2
Finally, one can check that mP0 > 0 (because β > 2/3). As a consequence, the first-best allocation
is an equilibrium.
APPENDIX D. OPTIMAL MONEY CREATION FOR LONG-LASTING TIGHTENING OF THE CREDIT
CONSTRAINTS
The optimal monetary policy is derived in three steps. First, we derive the optimal monetary
policy assuming the ZLB binds in period 1, and we show that existence conditions are satisfied.
Second, we show that the optimal allocation cannot be implemented if the ZLB does not bind.
Step 1: Assuming that cnt = c
n∗ and that cpt = cp∗ and that 1 + pi1 = β, the system (17) - (23)
gives the following process for money creation.
mCB0 = βc
n∗ − (1− d∗)
mp0 = c
n∗ + 3mCB0 + d
∗ − 1
mCB1 =
cp∗
3
− 1
3
(
1− 2m
CB
0
β
+
mp0
β
)
mCBt =
(d∗ − dt−1)− β (d∗ − dt)
3
+
2
3
mCBt−1
β
for t ≥ 2
The inflation rate is 1 + pit =
mnt−1
mnt −3mCBt
, t ≥ 2. One can check numerically that existence condi-
tions (4) and (3) are fulfilled and that 1+ pit > β for t 6= 1.
Step 2: Assuming the ZLB does not bind at any period, one can use the results of Proposition (1)
to determine the optimal money supply. Simulating the inflation rate with this path of the money
supply, one finds that 1+ pi1 < β, which proves that the equilibrium does not exist.
APPENDIX E. PRODUCTION ECONOMY
We now present the model with a production sector. Denote, as before qt−1 as the price in period
t− 1 of a unit of goods in period t (hence the real interest rate is 1+ rt−1 = 1/qt−1). Kt is the capital
invested in period t− 1 to produce in period t. The profit maximization of the representative firm
in real terms is
max
Kt,Ldt
Kαt
(
Ldt
)1−α − wtLdt − Kt/qt−1 + (1− δ)Kt
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gives
1
qt−1
= α
(
Kt
Ldt
)α−1
+ 1− δ
wt = (1− α)
(
Kt
Ldt
)α
The rest of the model is exactly as before: The households and the State are modeled as in
Section 3.1. There is no risk on any asset. There is one single financial market for the claims
issued by households and the representative firm. The financial market equilibrium is (claims are
substitutable)
bht = dt + 3Kt+1
The labor market equilibrium is Ldt = 2/3. The summary of the full model is now
mnt = wt + τt − dt−1 (35)
cnt =
mnt−1
1+ pit
+ τt + qtdt
qt
(
dt + 3Kt+1 − 3 (1− θ) m
CB
t
qt
)
+ mpt + c
p
t = wt + τt
+
(
dt−1 + 3Kt − 3
(1− θ)mCBt−1
qt−1
)
+
mpt−1
1+ pit
qtu′
(
cpt
)
= βu′
(
cpt+1
)
mpt = 0 if 1+ pit+1 > qt
wt = (1− α) (3Kt/2)α
1
qt−1
= α (3Kt/2)
α−1 + 1− δ
mnt + m
p
t =
mnt−1 + m
p
t−1
1+ pit
+ 3mCBt
τt = θmCBt + (1− θ)
mCBt−1
qt−1
Together with the inequalities
cnt , c
p
t , m
n
t , m
p
t ≥ 0
1+ pit+1 ≥ qt
and the condition
qtu′ (cnt ) > β2
1
1+ pit+2
u′ (cnt+2) (36)
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Given a deterministic sequence of credit constraint {dt}t≥0, a monetary policy {mCBt }t≥0, and an
initial capital stock K0 an equilibrium of this economy is a sequence {cnt , cpt , mnt , mpt , τt, qt,pit, Kt}t≥0
which satisfies the equations (35)-(36).
The steady state is defined as before as an economy where pi = τ = mCB = 0, where real
variables are constant and where dt = d∗. The steady state is defined by the following values
(denoted with a star)
q∗ = β, w∗ = 1, K∗ =
2
3
( 1
β − 1+ δ
α
) 1
α−1
, w∗ = (1− α)
( 1
β − 1+ δ
α
) α
α−1
,
cn∗ = w∗ − (1− β) d∗, cp∗ = 3 (K∗)α
(
2
3
)1−α
− 3δK∗ − cn∗
Following, the same steps as in (3.5), one finds that the steady state is optimal when ωp =
u′ (cn∗) /u′ (cp∗). If it is assumed that the initial capital stock is K0 = K∗, the optimal allocation is
cpt = c
p∗, cnt = cn∗ and Kt = K∗.
The proof of Propositions 1 to 4 can easily be adapted to this environment. Indeed, the Euler
equations are the same for both agents. The only difference between the production economy
and the endowment economy is that the real wage is different (but it is a normalization) and
participating agents now have an additional income 3Kt in each period. But this extra income
does not affect the structure of the proof.
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